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ABSTRACT
Some stylized facts and relations appear between the governance and 
the economic growth in Latin America. The principal indings suggest 
that: 1) In the region, the worst perception recounts to the indicator Rule 
of Law; nevertheless, this indicator is the one that best explains gover-
nance at aggregated level; 2) the indicators Voice and accountability, 
Rule of law and Control of corruption have relationship with the form of 
inverted U growth; and 3) the indicators Stability - politics, Governmental 
Eficacy and Regulative Quality have linear and positive relations with 
the growth. The panel of information includes annual indicators for elev-
en economies during the period 2001-2010.
INTRODUCTION
Traditionally it is considered that the development of an economy de-
pends on the existence of “good governance” (see Knack, 2003; Feng, 
2003). This belief is often supported by specialists from the growth and 
economic development and by international institutions of develop-
ment and aid. So the relationship between governance and economic 
growth is often seen as unambiguous, positive and signiicant. Moreover, 
some people assume that governance is a prerequisite to increase living 
standards in a sustained manner (see Dellepiane-Avellaneda, 2010).
Paradoxically, the literature shows that there is no such consensus. This 
situation occurs for conceptual, empirical and ideological reasons. First, 
governance is a multidimensional concept dificult to conceptualize and 
measure (Bevir, 2011). Usually, governance refers to the forms of social 
coordination and governance practices in an economy. For this reason, 
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it is usually deined in terms that 
are dificult to assess and quantify 
(social, political and institutional). 
In fact, the measurement of gov-
ernance causes major controversy 
among specialists (Norris, 2011).
The empirical literature on gov-
ernance and economic growth 
also tends to be ideologically po-
larized. This polarization is usually 
manifested between those who 
argue that governance is linked 
only to democratic regimes. So 
some argue that the relationship 
between governance and growth 
may be positive, negative or not 
signiicant (see Feng, 2003; Delle-
piane-Avellaneda, 2010). In addi-
tion, some argue that political gov-
ernance is not linked with political 
regimes. In the vision of these last, 
what matters are the institutions 
and property rights (North 1990 
and 2005; Acemoglu and Robin-
son, 2006 and 2012; Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson, 2005).
In this study some stylized facts 
and empirical relationships on gov-
ernance and economic growth in 
Latin America are shown. Method-
ologically, the research is based on 
using descriptive statistical tech-
niques, principal components and 
ordinary squared minimums. To 
ensure international and intertem-
poral consistency of indicators da-
tabases “Worldwide Governance 
Indicators, WGI” and “CEPALSTAT” 
are used. The panel includes an-
nual data for the eleven indicators 
economies during the period 2001-
2010.
Conceptually, here the deini-
tion of governance by Kaufmann, 
Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010:6) is 
used. Thus, governance is equiv-
alent to the traditions and institu-
tions by which authority in a coun-
try is exercised. It includes: a) the 
process by which governments are 
chosen, monitored and replaced; 
b) the effective capacity of the 
government to formulate and im-
plement reasonable policies; c) 
the respect of citizens and the 
state with the institutions that gov-
ern economic and social interac-
tions among them. This deinition is 
used because the WGI data base 
is built assuming the validity of it.
Methodologically, the research 
uses descriptive statistics and prin-
cipal components regression tech-
niques. The technique of principal 
components is used to construct 
and analyze an aggregate indica-
tor of the Governance by the data 
contained in the WGI. The WGI in-
cludes six variables related to differ-
ent dimensions of governance. Re-
gression analysis is used to estimate 
the empirical relations between 
governance and growth. The sev-
en estimated relationships are ana-
lyzed from a medium-term perspec-
tive. For simplicity, the estimated 
results are presented graphically.
The document is divided into 
six sections. The second section 
includes a review of the literature. 
The third describes the econom-
ic and institutional indicators. The 
fourth includes the descriptive 
analysis of indicators to show some 
stylized facts on governance and 
growth in Latin America. It also 
builds and analyzes the aggregat-
ed indicator of the Governance 
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by main components. In the ifth 
estimated empirical relationships 
between governance and growth 
is. The sixth section summarizes and 
discusses the results.
1. LITERATURE REVIEW
This section provides an overview 
of the theoretical discussions and 
empirical studies examining the 
relationship between governance 
and economic growth. In this 
context, it should be noted that 
although there is no consensus 
on the deinition of governance, 
it has a prescriptive connotation 
as it means an end and a result 
(Aguilar, 2010). Therefore, in the 
irst paragraph it is prescriptive 
and normative connotation in the 
context of relations between gov-
ernance and economic growth is 
emphasized. In the second section 
the empirical literature is reviewed.
1.1 GOVERNANCE AND 
ECONOMIC GROWTH
The literature that has studied the 
relationships of governance and 
economic growth is linked to the 
institutionalists theories proposed, 
among others, by North (1990) and 
Olson (1996), and the proponents 
of the “School of Compatibility”. 
These theories argue that devel-
opment depends on the ability to 
secure property rights and enforce 
contracts in the economies. Gov-
ernance, and eventually democ-
racy, promotes growth because 
they ensure property rights, busi-
ness transactions, social rights and 
the provision of public goods.
Studies of the relationship be-
tween governance and growth 
cannot be separated from the de-
bate about the role of government 
in the economy. Particularly, Bevir 
(2007) and Aguilar (2010) argue 
that the concept of governance 
relects the transformation in the 
vision of the State that occurred 
after the reforms of the public sec-
tor of the years 1980 and 1990. As 
is known, these reforms reduced 
the importance of bureaucracy 
and introduced market criteria in 
decision-making. For this reason, 
studies on governance have nor-
mative connotations.
Governance has changed the 
way of formulating and imple-
menting public policies; these are 
no longer considered as unilateral 
processes. Public decisions, from 
the perspective of governance, 
involve coordination, discussions, 
understandings, negotiations, 
agreements and public, private 
and social commitments1. 
In this context, Bevir (2007) and 
(2011), highlights the importance 
of markets, social networks and 
non-state actors for public policy. 
For this reason, Bevir emphasizes 
that governance deines rules that 
go beyond those deined by the 
formal powers of the State2.
Traditionally it is assumed that an 
improvement in governance and 
institutions can promote econom-
ic growth (North, 1990 and 2005; 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robin-
1  A comprehensive review of the concept of 
governance can be found in Bevir (2011).
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son, 2005, Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006 and 2012). 
So, some argue that consolidated governance and 
democratic institutions can enhance the growth of 
developing economies. However, it should be recog-
nized that this regulatory requirement has been ques-
tioned by Glaeser et. al. (2004) and by advocates of 
the “School of Conlict” and “skeptical school”. There-
fore, despite popular belief, there are still theoretical 
debates on the relationship between governance and 
economic growth.
1.2 EMPIRICAL STUDIES
In the empirical literature there are several studies that 
have examined the relationship between governance 
and economic growth. Among these studies are found 
the Knack and Keefer (1995), Mauro (1995) and Ale-
sina (1997). These studies were pioneers in evaluating 
the mentioned relationships focusing on the role of in-
stitutions and property rights. They pioneered the use of 
cross-sectional indicators for statistical validation.  Fur-
thermore, they were the irst to consider governance 
as a multidimensional phenomenon and that its analy-
sis could be separated from the political regimes.
Contemporary studies on the relationship of gov-
ernance and economic growth emphasize the role 
of property rights and the quality of institutions. These 
studies tend to ind positive relationships between the 
development of institutions and growth. Among these 
studies are those of Knack and Keefer (1995) and Ndu-
lu and O’Connell (1999), who evaluate how risk and 
violence are linked to economic growth. Rivera-Batiz 
(2002), meanwhile, analyzes the relationships between 
democracy, good governance and economic growth.
The mentioned studies are important because they 
tend to support the institutionalist theories (see North, 
1990 and 2005; Olson, 1996). Furthermore, they are im-
portant because they complement other studies on 
economic development. In particular, they comple-
ment studies that emphasize the role of political rights 
and civil liberties (Grier and Tullock, 1989), democracy 
and social conlicts (Keefer and Knack, 2002) and the 
importance of social capital (Gutierrez-Banegas and 
2 These new rules 
emphasize the eth-
ical content of the 
political and eco-
nomic institutions, 
while desirable as-
pects such as hon-
esty and indepen-
dence prescribe 
justice, low corrup-
tion or civic respon-
sibility. See Jalialian 
Kirkpatrick and Park-
er (2006).
Antonio Ruiz Porras / Nancy García  Vázquez
59
Ruiz-Porras, 2014). Also they com-
plement studies that emphasize 
the role of labor institutions (Free-
man, 1988 and 1998) and inancial 
(King and Levine, 1993) institutions.
Methodologically, the main lim-
itation of the empirical studies is that 
there are few consistent measures 
of quality of institutions and gov-
ernance (see Kurtz and Shcrank, 
2007; Bevir, 2011; Norris 2011). As in-
dicated, the measurement of gov-
ernance causes strong controversy. 
So far, the most ambitious project to 
measure governance consistently 
is the database Worldwide Gov-
ernance Indicators (WGI) devel-
oped by Kaufmann and Kraay and 
extended by Kraay and Mastruzzi 
(2007, 2010). In this project, gover-
nance is assumed as the ability of 
institutions to exercise authority and 
promote economic, social and po-
litical long lasting development. 
WGI data base has been used 
to evaluate the relationships be-
tween governance and econom-
ic performance. Particularly, Gani 
(2011) found that political stability 
and government eficiency are sig-
niicantly and positively correlated 
with growth. Voice prompts and 
accountability, and control of cor-
ruption are correlated signiicant-
ly and negatively. Ruiz-Porras and 
Hosten (2012), meanwhile, found 
that governance is positively re-
lated to foreign direct investment 
and that this relationship is of long 
term for Latin American econo-
mies.
The theoretical and method-
ological debates on the relation-
ship between governance and 
growth justify the need to develop 
empirical research. In this context, 
it should be considered that gover-
nance has a multidimensional na-
ture and linear relationships could 
not exist. It also should be noted 
that a irst evaluation should focus 
on the “stylized facts” of relations 
between governance and growth. 
These considerations are empha-
sized because these are what de-
ine the methodological approach 
of the research conducted.
2. ECONOMIC AND 
INSTITUTIONAL 
INDICATORS
In this section data and indica-
tors used in this research are de-
scribed. Particularly, governance 
indicators are constructed using 
the database “Worldwide Gover-
nance Indicators” (WGI) from the 
World Bank. The economic indica-
tor of economic growth is the one 
included in the base “Cepalstat” 
of the Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC). The set of variables ana-
lyzed is a balanced annual panel 
of 110 observations. It comprises 
data from eleven Latin American 
economies for 2001 and 2010.
Statistically, the panel includes 
data comparable and consistent 
over time. The panel includes data 
for Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Ven-
ezuela. The panel comprises sever-
al variables and indicators adjust-
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ed. Panel variables include variables of disaggregated 
economic growth and governance. The WGI uses six 
variables of governance because it is believed that it 
is characterized as multidimensional. Table 1 describes 
the variables of growth and governance used in the 
study.
TABLE 1. VARIABLES OF
 GROWTH AND GOVERNANCE.
Name Variable Source
Economic Growth Per capita GDP growth GDP Cepalstat
Governance Voice and Accountability VAA WGI
Political Stability PSAA WGI
Regulatory Quality RQ WGI
Government Effectiveness GE WGI
Rule of law ROL WGI
Corruption control COC WGI
Source: Own construction.
Analytically, disaggregated governance variables 
allow building governance adjusted indicators un-
derlying the analysis of stylized facts. As mentioned, 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010) note that vari-
ables of governance are built on the assumption that 
governance are the traditions and institutions by which 
authority in a country is exercised. This deinition is em-
phasized here because there is no agreed framework 
of governance from an empirical perspective. Disag-
gregated indicators are deined in the table 23.
3 Governance vari-
ables are estimated 
using unobservable 
component mod-
els using qualitative 
indicators on the 
perception of gov-
ernment. The indi-
cators are derived 
from surveys, NGOs, 
information provid-
ers in commercial 
enterprises and or-
ganizations of public 
sector.
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TABLE 2. DISAGGREGATED INDICATORS OF GOVERNANCE.
Indicator Deinition
Voice and 
Accountability
It measures the extent to which citizens of a country 
can participate in selecting their government, as well 
as freedom of expression, freedom of association and 
freedom of the media
Political Stability Measures perceptions of the likelihood that the govern-
ment will be destabilized or taken by unconstitutional 
or violent means, including acts of political violence or 
terrorism
Government
 Effectiveness
It measures the quality of public services, the quality of 
public administration and its degree of independence 
from political pressures, the quality of the formulation 
and implementation of public policies and the credibil-
ity of the government’s commitment to such policies
Regulatory Quality It measures the ability of the government to formulate 
and implement appropriate policies and to enable 
and promote private sector development regulations.
Rule of law
It measures the extent to which agents have coni-
dence and obey the rules of society; in particular, it 
measures the quality of contract enforcement, the ac-
tions by the courts and the police force; as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence acts to be committed.
Corruption Control
It measures the extent to which public power is ex-
ercised for private gain and corruption in small and 
large scale, as well as control of the state by elites and 
private interests.
Source: Own based on Kaufmann, Kraay y Mastruzzi (2010).
Methodologically, it should be noted that the six 
governance indicators disaggregated are adjust-
ed to facilitate their interpretation. Adjustments 
are made so that the indicators are expressed on 
a scale of zero to 100 4. Also, the data is adjusted so 
high indicator values indicate high levels of gover-
nance. In this context, and to simplify the analysis, 
an aggregate indicator referred as Indicator Add-
ed Governance is estimated. The indicator sum-
marizes the information of the disaggregated in-
dicators based on the main components method.
4 The adjustment 
is required due to 
the fact that gov-
ernance variables 
are expressed on a 
scale of -2.5 to 2.5.
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3. ANALYSIS OF DESCRIPTIVE  
STATISTICS AND PRINCIPAL  
COMPONENTS
This section shows the descriptive statistics of the indicators of growth and 
governance for Latin American economies during the analyzed period. 
The analysis of the main components is also developed.
An analysis of the Governance aggregate indicator is needed to as-
sess the representativeness of the indicator and to analyze the contri-
bution of disaggregated indicators in its construction. For simplicity, the 
results are shown in tables. Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics. Tables 
4 and 5 show the results of principal component analysis.
TABLE 3. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE GROWTH
 INDICATORS AND GOVERNANCE.
Indicator Obs. Average
Standard 
Deviation
Slant Kurtosis Mínimum Maximum
Growth
Growth rate 110 2.711 4.109 -0.422 5.221 -11.000 16.190
Governance
Indicator 
Added 
Governance
110 46.694 26.417 0.505 2.154 0.000 100.000
Voice and 
Account-
ability
110 51.447 11.191 0.481 1.997 31.970 72.740
Political 
Stability
110 40.582 15.727 -0.032 2.508 2.200 69.730
Regulatory 
Quality
110 45.768 11.232 -0.519 2.332 17.840 61.940
Govern-
ment Effec-
tiveness
110 42.587 10.139 0.283 1.763 27.430 62.730
Rule of law 110 39.105 12.434 0.567 2.297 17.100 63.920
Corruption 
Control
110 42.848 12.878 0.766 2.987 21.090 74.890
Source: Own based on Kaufmann, Kraay y Mastruzzi (2010).
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Source: Own calculation.
TABLE 5. MAIN COMPONENTS AND EIGENVECTORS.
Variable Comp1 Comp2 Comp3 Comp4 Comp5 Comp6
Voice and 
Accountability
0.4312 0.2063 0.0135 -0.4485 -0.1224 -0.7451
Political 
Stability
0.3589 0.7829 0.2349 0.2309 0.3037 0.2399
Regulatory 
Quality
0.3872 -0.4882 0.6632 0.3714 0.1176 -0.1419
Government 
Effectiveness
0.4221 -0.3002 -0.1650 -0.5430 0.4968 0.4034
Rule of law 0.4341 -0.0049 0.0150 -0.0732 -0.7912 0.4242
Corruption 
Control
0.4108 -0.1268 -0.6909 0.5544 0.0779 -0.1564
Source: Own calculation.
Table 3 shows some facts concerning the behavior of the indicators. In 
particular, the table shows that, on average, the economies had annual 
growth rates of per capita GDP of 2.7 percent. Similarly, with respect to 
indicators disaggregated governance, the table shows that: 1) The best 
perception of governance in Latin American countries refers to Voice 
and Accountability; 2) refers to the worst perception rule of law; and 
3) perceptions of Political Stability experience the greatest variations 
among the analyzed economies.
TABLE 4. MAIN COMPONENTS AND CORRELATIONS.
Component Eigenvalor Diffrence Proportion Cumulative
Comp1 5.08 4.56 0.85 0.85
Comp2 0.52 0.29 0.09 0.93
Comp3 0.23 0.16 0.04 0.97
Comp4 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.99
Comp5 0.06 0.03 0.01 1.00
Comp6 0.03 . 0.01 1.00
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Tables 4 and 5 show the analysis of the main components. Table 4 shows 
that the aggregate indicator of Governance summarizes the 85 percent 
of the indicators disaggregated information. Table 5, shows the informa-
tional contributions from the six disaggregated governance indicator. 
These contributions, measured from highest to lowest, are: 1) Rule of Law; 
2) Voice and Accountability; 3) Government Effectiveness; 4) Control of 
Corruption; 5) Regulatory Quality; and 6) Political Stability.
Finally, it should be emphasized that the main stylized facts on growth 
and governance are: 1) on average, the economies had annual growth 
rates of GDP per capita of 2.7 percent; 2) the best insight on governance 
refers to Voice and Accountability; 3) the worst perception refers to rule 
of law; 4) added Governance Indicator 85 percent summarizes the infor-
mation disaggregated indicators; 5) Rule of Law provides the greatest 
contribution to build the aggregate indicator; and 6) Political Stability 
provides the lowest contribution.
4. ANALYSIS
This section estimates and analyzes the estimated empirical relationships 
between economic growth and governance. To do this the average of 
both types of each economy indicator are calculated. These averages 
are used to study the relationships seen from a medium-term perspec-
tive. Methodologically the ordinary minimum squares method are used 
to analyze these relationships. In all cases, governance indicators linear 
and quadratic used to estimate potential nonlinear relationships. For sim-
plicity, the estimated results are presented graphically.
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Figure 1. Rates of Growth and Governance Indicator Added.
Source: Own calculation.
Figure 1 shows the relationship between the growth 
rate and the aggregated Governance Indicator. The 
econometric relationship clearly shows the shape of an 
inverted U in the medium term. So there is a positive 
relationship between growth and governance when 
governance indicators are low. However, this relation-
ship becomes negative when the indicators are high. 
Apparently, the turning point occurs when rates ex-
ceed 3 percent annually. Moreover, the estimate sug-
gests that improvements in aggregated governance 
indicator could be associated with higher growth rates 
in Brazil, Ecuador, Honduras, Peru and Venezuela.
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Figure 2. Growth rates and voice and accountability.
Source: Own calculation.
Figure 2 shows the relationship between the growth rate of 
GDP and Voice and Accountability indicator. The estimat-
ed econometric relationship, as in the previous case, shows 
the shape of an inverted U in the medium term. Apparent-
ly, the turning point occurs when governance indicators 
exceed the value of 60 or when growth rates reached 
3.2 percent on a sustained basis. Moreover, the estimate 
suggests that improvements in Voice and Accountability 
could be associated with higher growth rates in Bolivia, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, Peru and Venezuela.
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Figure 3. Growth Rates and Rule of Law.
Source: Own calculation.
Figure 3 shows the relationship between the growth rate 
of GDP and the Rule of Law indicator. The estimated, as 
before, econometric relationship shows an inverted U 
shape in the medium term. Apparently, the turning point 
occurs when governance indicators exceed the value of 
49 or when growth rates reached 3.4 percent on a sus-
tained basis. Moreover, the estimate suggests that im-
provements in the Rule of Law could be associated with 
higher growth rates in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Hondu-
ras, Peru and Venezuela.
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Figure 4. Growth Rates and Control of Corruption.
Source: Own calculation.
Figure 4 shows the relationship between the growth 
rate of GDP and Control of Corruption indicator. The 
estimated, as before, econometric relationship shows 
an inverted U shape in the medium term. Apparently, 
the turning point occurs when governance indicators 
exceed the value of 55 or when growth rates reached 
3.1 percent on a sustained basis. Moreover, the esti-
mate suggests that improvements in Control of Corrup-
tion could be associated with higher growth rates in 
Bolivia, Ecuador, Honduras, Peru and Venezuela.
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Figure 5. Growth Rates and Political Stability.
Source: Own calculation.
Figure 5 shows the relationship between the growth 
rate of GDP and Political Stability indicator. The esti-
mated econometric relationship is virtually linear and 
positive in the medium term. The regression results sug-
gest that for every unit in which the governance indi-
cator increases, the annual growth rate increased by 
about 0.03 percent. Likewise, the estimate suggests 
that improvements in Political Stability may be associ-
ated with higher growth rates in Bolivia, Ecuador, Hon-
duras, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.
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Figure 6. Growth Rates and Government Effectiveness.
Source: Own calculation.
Figure 6 shows the relationship between the per capi-
ta growth rate of GDP and the Government Effective-
ness indicator. As in the previous case, the estimated 
econometric relationship is substantially linear and 
positive in the medium term. For approximately every 
unit in which the governance indicator increases, the 
annual growth rate increased by 0.03 percent. Like-
wise, the estimate suggests that improvements in Gov-
ernment Effectiveness may be associated with higher 
growth rates in Bolivia, Honduras, Peru, Uruguay and 
Venezuela.
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Figure 7. Growth Rates and Regulatory Quality.
Source: Own calculation.
Figure 7 shows the relationship between the per capita 
growth rate of GDP and Regulatory Quality indicator. 
The estimated, as before, econometric relationship is 
virtually linear and positive in the medium term. For ap-
proximately every unit in which the governance indi-
cator increases, the annual growth rate increased by 
0.06 percent. Likewise, the estimate suggests that im-
provements in Regulatory Quality could be associated 
with higher growth rates in Bolivia, Honduras, Peru and 
Venezuela.
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Analytically it is interesting to note some singular 
facts in the analyzed relationships. The irst is that Para-
guay and Panama have the highest growth rates de-
spite their governance indicators are in the average of 
the sample. This suggests that Paraguay and Panama´s 
growth was unusual during the period analyzed. The 
second is that Uruguay and Costa Rica have relatively 
low growth rates despite having the highest indicators 
of governance in the region. This suggests that there is 
conditional convergence between governance and 
economic growth5.
Empirical relations can be synthesized between gov-
ernance and economic growth as follows: 1) Aggre-
gate Governance Indicators, Voice and Accountabil-
ity, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption are related 
with growth with inverted U-shape; 2) Political Stability, 
Government Effectiveness and Regulatory Quality in-
dicators have a linear and positive relationship con-
cerning growth; 3) the growth of Paraguay and Pan-
ama has been atypical in the analyzed period; and 
4)  there may be conditional convergence between 
governance and growth in Latin America.
6. CONCLUSION
In this study we have shown some stylized facts and 
empirical relationships on governance and econom-
ic growth in Latin America. Methodologically, the re-
search has been based on the use of techniques of 
descriptive statistics, principal component and OLS. To 
ensure international and intertemporal consistency of 
the indicators databases have been used “Worldwide 
Governance Indicators” and “CEPALSTAT”. The panel 
includes annual data for the eleven indicators econo-
mies during the period 2001-2010.
The results of the analysis of descriptive statistics and 
principal components show the following stylized facts 
in the region: 1) On average, Latin American econo-
mies had annual growth rates of 2.7 percent; 2) the 
best insight on governance refers to Voice and Ac-
countability; 3) the worst perception refers to rule of 
law; 4) Added Governance Indicator summarizes the 
5 The traditional 
convergence hy-
pothesis states that 
poor economies 
tend to grow faster 
than rich econo-
mies and in the long 
term, production 
and productivity 
tend to converge 
between the two 
types of economies. 
The conditional con-
vergence hypoth-
esis suggests that 
production and pro-
ductivity in the long 
term will depend 
on the technologi-
cal, institutional and 
public policy of the 
economies (see Bar-
ro and Sala- i- Mar-
tin, 2004) . The condi-
tional convergence 
hypothesis on the re-
lationship between 
governance and 
economic growth 
has been discussed, 
among others, Olson 
(1996) , Knack (2003) 
and Dellepiane - 
Avellaneda ( 2010). 
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85 percent of the disaggregated 
indicators information; 5) Rule of 
Law provides the largest contribu-
tion in the aggregate indicator; 
and 6) Political Stability provides 
the lowest contribution.
The regression analysis suggests 
that there is  the following  empir-
ical relationship between gover-
nance and economic growth: 1) 
Aggregate Governance Indicators 
Voice and Accountability, Rule 
of Law and Control of Corruption 
have  a growth relationship with 
the U-shaped inverted; 2) Political 
Stability, Government Effectiveness 
and Regulatory Quality indica-
tors have linear and positive rela-
tionship with growth; 3) economic 
growth of Paraguay and Panama 
was unusual; and 4)  there may 
be conditional convergence be-
tween governance and growth.
The above results have impli-
cations for policy makers in Latin 
America. Particularly the results 
suggest that policies should con-
sider: 1) The elements of gover-
nance have a distinct importance; 
2) the relationship between gover-
nance and economic growth may 
not necessarily be linear or posi-
tive; 3) the construction of gover-
nance seems to depend, in the irst 
instance, it has a good perception 
of the rule of law; and 4) therefore, 
what matters is that the agents 
trust and obey the rules of society.
Finally it only remains to empha-
size that the results are consistent 
with the hypothesis that there are 
signiicant relationships between 
governance and growth. Howev-
er, it should be recognized that 
empirical analysis should be further 
deepened to make policy recom-
mendations. In this context, it is re-
quired to validate the existence of 
not spurious and long-term relation-
ships. Also, it should be determined 
the causality in the relationship of 
governance and other variables. 
For these reasons, we can say that 
the analysis of governance and its 
relations is a promising ield of re-
search for development.
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